Cybersecurity for AI Systems from First PrinciplesPost 18 of 19 · 19 of 19 written
- How to use this guide
- 01What security actually is
- 02How computers fail
- 03Networks
- 04Cryptography
- 05Identity and access
- 06Web and application security
- 07Cloud, infrastructure, supply chain, detection
- 08The bridge: why AI systems are different
- 09Adversarial machine learning
- 10LLM and generative AI security
- 11Agentic systems
- 12The ML supply chain and MLOps
- 13Privacy, governance and regulation
- 14Red teaming, evaluation, and AI for defense
- 15Worked example: threat-modeling an AI agent
- 16The question toolkit
- 17Learning path, practice, reading list
- 18Glossary
- 19Sources
18. Glossary
Cybersecurity · 18 of 194 min readOct 2026
Cybersecurity · Post 18 of 194 min readOct 2026
One-line definitions of the terms used throughout the guide, alphabetical. The part where each is explained in depth is in brackets.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Adaptive attack | An attack designed with full knowledge of the specific defense it targets [9, 14] |
| Adversarial example | An input changed slightly, often imperceptibly, to make a model err [9] |
| AEAD | Authenticated encryption: confidentiality and integrity together, e.g. AES-GCM [4] |
| AIBOM | AI bill of materials: an inventory of models, datasets, versions and sources [12] |
| Attack success rate (ASR) | Fraction of attack attempts that achieve the attacker’s goal [14] |
| Attack surface | Every point where an attacker can interact with a system [1] |
| Authentication / authorization | Proving who you are / deciding what you may do [5] |
| Backdoor (trojan) | Hidden model behaviour triggered by a secret input pattern [9] |
| Blast radius | How much damage follows if one component is fully compromised [1] |
| Broken object-level authorization (IDOR) | Access granted to an object without checking it belongs to the requester [5, 6] |
| Canary token | A unique planted string whose appearance elsewhere reveals a leak [14] |
| CIA triad | Confidentiality, integrity, availability [1] |
| Confidential computing / TEE | Hardware-isolated execution that shields data in use, with attestation [4] |
| Confused deputy | A program tricked into using its authority on behalf of someone without it [5, 11] |
| Content Security Policy (CSP) | Browser rules limiting which scripts and resources a page may load [6] |
| CVE / CVSS | Public vulnerability identifier / generic severity score from 0 to 10 [6, 16] |
| Data poisoning | Corrupting training data to change model behaviour [9] |
| Defense in depth | Layered controls so a single failure is not fatal [1] |
| Differential privacy (ε) | Provable limit on what an output reveals about any one individual; ε is the budget [9] |
| DPIA | Data protection impact assessment, required under GDPR for high-risk processing [13] |
| Egress filtering | Controlling which outbound connections a workload may make [3] |
| Evasion attack | Fooling a deployed model at inference time [9] |
| Excessive agency | An AI system with more tools, permissions or autonomy than its task needs [10, 11] |
| Exfiltration | Moving data out of a system to an attacker [10, 11] |
| Forward secrecy | Past sessions stay safe even if a long-term key is later stolen [3] |
| Guardrail | A control around a model: a classifier, a filter or a policy [10, 14] |
| Hidden context exposure | Extraction of system prompts, tool schemas or other non-user context [10] |
| Indirect prompt injection | Instructions hidden in content a model processes on a user’s behalf [10] |
| Jailbreak | Getting a model to violate its own safety policy [10] |
| Kerckhoffs’s principle | Assume the attacker knows the design; only keys are secret [1] |
| Least privilege / least agency | Minimum permissions / minimum autonomy for the task [1, 11] |
| Lethal trifecta | Private data + untrusted content + external communication in one agent [11] |
| MCP | Model Context Protocol, a standard for connecting agents to tools and data [11] |
| Membership inference | Determining whether a record was in a model’s training set [9] |
| MITRE ATT&CK / ATLAS | Catalogues of real attacker tactics and techniques; ATLAS covers AI [7, 8] |
| Model extraction | Copying a model’s behaviour through queries [9] |
| Model inversion | Reconstructing sensitive training features or inputs from a model [9] |
| mTLS | Mutual TLS, where client and server both present certificates [3] |
| OAuth 2.0 / OIDC | Delegated authorization with scoped tokens / identity layer on top [5] |
| Passkey / WebAuthn | Phishing-resistant login bound cryptographically to the real website [5] |
| Pickle | Python serialization format that can execute code when loaded [2, 12] |
| Provenance | Verifiable record of where an artifact came from and how it was built [7, 12] |
| Red teaming | Adversarial testing to find failures before attackers do [14] |
| Rug pull | A tool or dependency changing after it was approved [11] |
| safetensors | A data-only model weight format with no code execution on load [12] |
| SBOM | Software bill of materials: an inventory of components [7] |
| SLSA | Framework of build-integrity levels centred on signed provenance [7] |
| SSRF | Server-side request forgery: making a server fetch an attacker-chosen URL [6] |
| STRIDE | Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege [1] |
| Supply chain attack | Compromise through a dependency, build system or third-party artifact [7, 12] |
| Taint tracking | Following untrusted data through a system and restricting where it may flow [11] |
| Threat model | A structured description of assets, adversaries, entry points and mitigations [1, 15] |
| TOCTOU | Time-of-check to time-of-use: something changes between being checked and used [2] |
| Trust boundary | A line where data or control passes between different trust levels [1] |
| Trusted computing base (TCB) | The components whose correctness your security depends on [1] |
| XSS | Cross-site scripting: attacker script running in your site’s origin [6] |
| Zero trust | No implicit trust from network location; every request is verified [1, 3] |